Sociology Insights

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Civil Society and Authoritarian Rule. Ethiopia's Charities and Societies Law and Experiences of NGO Leaders

Carl Milofsky[1]*, Albert Hunter[2]

[1]Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, USA
[2]Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, Illinois, USA

Abstract

This paper presents an irony, that despite having authoritarian system that has worked to suppress civil society, the authoritarian government of Ethiopia was unable to do this during the period when these data were collected, in 2010. Western theories of civil society argue that the distinctive structures of civil society in different nations are related to historical traditions shaping strong states. In these societies civil society organizations play an important intermediary role between the state and citizens. In Ethiopia, however, the state is weak and despite the coercive efforts of the state, civil society has remained strong. Evidence for this is provided in this paper through interviews of people who led NGOs that were forced to lay off most of their employees after passage and implementation of the Charities and Societies Act in 2009. These respondents argued that despite the coercive power wielded by the state, grass roots democratic organizations were so wide spread, so functionally effective, and so important to the people that they would continue on even if central offices were forced to lay off most of their paid employees. Seven years after these interviews were carried out, claims about the strength of civil society in Ethiopia were borne out in the spring of 2018 as a new democratic government took power in Ethiopia and lifted repressive controls.

In 2018, authoritarian government in Ethiopia was dismantled and civil society organizations and opposition social and political leaders were given freedom to operate [1-3]. This follows a period of more than ten years during which democratically elected political leaders were arrested or forced to flee the county, indigenous news reporters were arrested or forced to flee, and nongovernmental organizations were forced to close down. Important opposition leaders were given death penalties if they returned to the country and the secret police engaged in a constant effort to blackmail and discredit opposition leaders. The death of the authoritarian leader did not stop this process of government until a new prime minister was elected in early 2018 who released political prisoners, lifted death sentences, and allowed democratic political parties and NGOs to function once again.

This paper is based on an interview study with nine NGO leaders shortly after the "Charities and Societies Law" began to be implemented in the Spring of 2009. These interviews were carried out in April of 2010, shortly before a parliamentary election was scheduled to be held in May. Some respondents were quite frightened about being interviewed, but agreed to these conversations with the understanding that results of the interviews, with identities hidden, would be published before the election. Results were published as a blog (accessed February 20, 2020 [http://milofsky1.wordpress.com]) shortly before the election and this material was widely read in Ethiopia according to reports from political activists form the country. Two other reports of this study have been published which provide a political history of the country and that give a detailed analysis of the Charities and Societies Law [4, 5] and since this material is available we will only provide a brief account of the political history of the country in the present paper.

This paper focuses on a theme running through the interviews that civil society remained strong in Ethiopia despite the threats from and repressive character of the government. Respondents were confident that in time things would change, government would return to being more of a partner with civil society, and democracy would re-emerge. Happily, their prognostications seem to have been correct. But this outcome creates a puzzle for social scientists.

Conceptualizations like that of [6] view civil society as a set of institutions that lie between and link citizens with the state. They use a comparative framework to delineate the structure of civil societies in different countries. Through long-term research they have identified a large set of variables they can use to describe different kinds of civil society patterns. The variables that shape civil society are, in turn, defined

Correspondence to: Carl Milofsky, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, USA; E-mail: Milofsky[AT] Bucknell[DOT]edu

Received: Feb 22, 2020; **Accepted:** Feb 24, 2020; **Published:** March 06, 2020

as a function of state structures. Salamon, Sokolowski, and Haddock link state structures to the historical constitution of elites since these generally determine governance patterns of a country. They view civil society as a set of institutions that lie between and link citizens with the state.

Informants for the present study viewed the state as one of a cluster of associations, organizations, and institutions that make up civil society. It is true that the state has dominant access to coercive resources and that it controls key functions like the ability to print money and to be recognized internationally as the official representative of the society. But the government is weak in terms of its ability to carry out other functions. It has trouble providing services citizens consider vital. Citizens do not feel that such services as are provided are fairly distributed. The government has trouble defining its own internal rules and norms of operation. It has trouble linking regional authorities at different levels of aggregation (the locality to the region to the nation) and the state has trouble being a source of identification and legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. In some ways the state cannot control its own boundaries. International organizations like NGOs and foreign service branches of Western governments that span international boundaries define how important services will be carried out.

Civil society organizations may be more effective at carrying out each of these functions. It seems more accurate to view Ethiopian society as an ecology of horizontally positioned organizations and institutions. When civil society is positioned between the state and the citizens, the structure is vertically organized. In Ethiopia, the state is one of a number of competing institutions that interact and mutually influence each other. In the vertical model the pattern is fixed, static, and historically determined.

If a state is authoritarian and the civil society sector is suppressed, we would expect that over time the informal networks that support associations and make civil society robust would gradually wither. This is Robert Putnam's [7, 8] concern, that without participation, the capacity for citizen concerns to be represented will die out.

That does not seem to have been the pattern in Ethiopia. One task of this paper is to present data from our interview study showing that this is not the case. The second, more theoretical task, is to square the theory of civil society with these findings.

The Research

The argument we present in this paper is based on nine interviews of Ethiopian leaders of civil society organizations in Ethiopia in April 2010. The interviews were motivated by passage of Ethiopia's Charities and Societies Law in 2009 and its implementation in February 2010, immediately preceding the parliamentary elections in May 2010 [4].

Bucknell University's Institutional Review Board approved the research plan. The research was challenging because various of the Ethiopian participants worried that if their participation was known they were in danger of being imprisoned. One of the important participants was a prominent Ethiopian journalist who served as the "fixer" for the project. That is, in advance of arrival by the interviewer, Milofsky, he secured a list of NGOs in Ethiopia from the national association of nonprofits. Scanning the list, he selected about 15 NGOs that he knew to be significant and that he judged to represent different types and political positions among the array of NGOs. He then made appointments with leaders of these NGOs to coincide with the ten-day period when Milofsky was on site.

The fixer who worked with Milofsky in Ethiopia served as a translator with interview subjects when that was necessary. He also helped to explain to Milofsky social and political background context factors when they were relevant to the interviews. In each case after an interview was completed Milofsky wrote up a field notes account of the interview and then this was over-read by the fixer who corrected errors and elaborated on important contextual points.

While the people interviewed and the fixer felt at risk, each of them also wanted the story they would tell to come out and preferably before the election scheduled to occur three weeks after the interviews. To meet their desire, Milofsky wrote a blog providing a detailed academic analysis of the political situation in Ethiopia. The blog was widely circulated within Ethiopia. Following our agreement with the Bucknell University IRB, with publication of this paper the data are being destroyed.

Seven of those interviewed led organizations with significant programs labeled "advocacy" by the Law. Since they received more than 10% of their funding from outside of Ethiopia those programs had to be terminated and staff members had to be fired. While the initial focus of our research was on the concept of organizations, each interview became a life history of the respondent and a story about that person's involvement in building institutions of government and developing civil society within Ethiopia.

The authoritarian government of Ethiopia was an adversary for these organizations. Blocking their efforts to build civil society was a specific target of government repression. Despite a variety of government attacks, including imprisonment of leaders, all but one of the interviewees were confident that they could continue to find ways to use their organizational programs to build civil society in years to come. Furthermore, all were confident that civil society networks would play a significant role in moving past the present period of repression in Ethiopia.

Recounting the interviews in this paper will do two things.

First, the interviews lay bare a historical trajectory of the development of civil society in Ethiopia. The point at which the interviews were done was but a chronological point on an unfolding time line that extended into the future. We tend to understand societies in terms of static concepts and frozen causal patterns—if we have a dictatorship, then civil society is suppressed and cannot be brought back to life. For some analysts, this justifies a claim that these societies are not ready

for democracy [9, 10]. For our respondents the current moment, when our interviews were done, was a time of repression but it was but one moment in a developing history

Respondents told a shared story having to do with institution building. In one story they were participants in the process of creating an institutionalized state. Sometimes they were part of government and other times they were opponents, perhaps even being imprisoned for a time. There is a second story having to do with the evolution of the international aid industry and its changing programmatic, ideological, and assistance commitments. The involvement of international NGOs and multilateral aid in Ethiopia has been inextricably bound up with the national political culture of the country as it is with the prospects for national political change and liberalization in the future.

Second, we will learn that civil society in Ethiopia has meant four things.

a) It involves networks of interconnection among leaders, constituencies, and support groups that have experience, endurance and the capacity to be mobilized.

b) It involves a cultural infrastructure within Ethiopian society such that citizens have skills related to participation and mobilization and these are embedded in the normal living patterns of the country's life.

c) It involves political learning by citizens that fosters dialog and participation.

d) It involves the diaspora community whose members both provide remittances back to the country and who provide linkages to the international movement for human rights.

Citizens learned that involvement in a single participatory project could serve as a template for being involved in other, substantively disconnected actions and debates. In this way single participatory involvements became an orientation towards and an interest in politics more generally. These insights about civil society among citizens are basically the same as lessons we see taught by civil society in other countries where we have worked—the United States and Northern Ireland [11 – 14].

The Historical Trajectory

As we have said, interviews for this study were carried out in April, 2010, a few weeks before parliamentary elections were to be held. Although respondents knew the government would overwhelmingly win the election, the moment was important because it echoed the parliamentary election held in 2005. The government lost important parts of that election and responded by nullifying results, arresting democratic opposition leaders, and starting on a course of suppressing civil society and the free press. The democratically elected mayor of the capital city of Addis Ababa, Berhanu Nega, was arrested and ultimately allowed to flee to the United States where he became an Economics professor at Milofsky's university, Bucknell [15]. In 2008, the free press was closed down and reporters were forced to flee or face imprisonment. That same year, the Charities and Societies Law was passed by the parliament and it began to be implemented in February, 2009, resulting in most of the NGOS led by our interviewees losing their funding and being forced to lay off staff. This inaugurated the "authoritarian state" that is in the title of this paper.

Ethiopia had a "strong man" style of government from the time when the current government came to power in 1992. This occurred in part because the ruling party was drawn primarily from the Tigray section in northern Ethiopia and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Once the government was established this became the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the current ruling party but with its roots and strongest support in Tigray.

The authoritarian initiative represented a sharp departure from what had gone on in the first 13 years of its rule. During the first seven years, up until the 2000 parliamentary election, the government was in chaos. This simply reflects the situation that follows creation of a new government when there were essentially no pre-existing governing arrangements. The government is institutionally young and the NGO leaders we interviewed played central roles in writing the constitution, setting up the parliament, and creating norms and practices that members of parliament had to follow (things as simple as requiring that they wear shoes). These people were not only directly involved but their organizations played central roles in teaching the population at large how to vote, how to participate in democratic processes, and working to resolve festering conflicts that were going on between ethnic groups at the community level.

The EPRDF started with a blank slate because it was a revolutionary movement that overthrew a previous Marxist, totalitarian, and bloodthirsty government called The Dergue. The Dergue came into power when its leaders assassinated the iconic king, Haile Selassie in 1974. It was a client state of the Soviet Union and was explicitly communist until the Soviet Union collapsed, terminating its support of the Ethiopian government. The Dergue engaged in a widespread program of state terrorism that led to a revolutionary movement that started in Tigray and eventually took over the government, leading to the state transition in 1992.

This history shaped the current governing system in Ethiopia since most of the leadership group, that included the people we interviewed, played a role in the rebellion against the Dergue. Some people were military leaders in the rebellion. Other people gained high visibility because they were arrested by the Dergue and became celebrated political prisoners. Because of these historical roles it was easy for these individuals to assume roles in the new government when it was formed. But even if they did not take government roles these people assumed leadership positions in the NGO sector as it took shape. One consequence of the Dergue period is that a generation of young people had its numbers depleted. Even if people did not play a noteworthy role in the revolution and escaped abroad to secure an education, the population of leaders knew each

other well and personally. As the new government was built there was a need for competent people and people found many opportunities.

Another key aspect of this period was that international NGOs came to the country and played a large role in funding its development and recovery. The Ethiopian famine of the early 1980s caught world attention and led to massive fundraising efforts including the Band Aid concerts of 1982. Apparently, large amounts of the funding provided by Band Aid were siphoned off to support the military efforts of the TPLF—a BBC report tells us that only 5% of those funds were actually used to feed people with the rest going to buy arms and to support administrative expenses for the TPLF [16]. The famine and the revolution led to intense interest from international NGOs and from Western governments and they began extensive aid programs in a variety of areas. The result has been that Ethiopia receives more NGO funding than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa. This, in turn, created rich opportunities for entrepreneurship among young, educated Ethiopians who sought to build lives of public service. These are the people we interviewed fifteen years along from this early history when they founded a variety of indigenous NGOs, well-funded by western international organizations.

Interviews

This section of the paper presents detailed summary of some of our interviews. The point of the interviews is to provide rich, contextual information that develops and justifies the claims we have made about the character of civil society in Ethiopia and the relationships of civil society actors to the authoritarian state.

Participation International

Participation International is a national organization centrally involved with the national government. The organization is deeply connected with its founder, AB, and his network connections with the Ethiopian nonprofit sector as it developed in the 1990s and after 2000. There was no institutionalized state after the revolution in the early 1990s and details of things like the organization of parliament had to be invented and institutionalized. AB was a central actor in that process working as the representative of a major nonprofit. As a consequence he had and continues to have strong network ties both to other nonprofit sector leaders and to leading figures in the government. When the government turned in the direction of authoritarianism after 2005, AB and his organization took an increasingly visible role organizing public fora that were critical of the government. This resulted in his being imprisoned for two years. Oddly, from an outsider's perspective, this did not bother AB too much. He was confident that the authoritarian style of the government was a phase that would pass. He had been in prison, knew the system well, and he was able to continue being an active worker for his organization while he was on the inside. Despite the repressiveness of the Charities and Societies law, AB and Participation International remained central to the governance process in Ethiopian society.

The Case

When AB started talking about his organization the first thing he wanted to explain is how the name of the organization has changed. During most of its history it was named the African Democracy Coalition (ADC) but this kind of language is not acceptable under the new Charities and Societies Law so it had to be changed. In his conversations with the government he made the argument that such a change would hurt the organization because it is so well known under its old name. The government in this case was relatively flexible and allowed them to retain the organization's name in Amharic and, more importantly, to use the acronym for its Amharic name as the new organizational name: ENVLV. Since the acronym really has no meaning but is widely familiar to the public, it works for both the organization and the government. (Since we have changed the name for this report the preceding paragraph does not quite make sense but the point is made!)

ADC was established in 1995. AB was working for another NGO at the time, which was a national "education for democracy" organization. Before that and during the governmental transition when the EPRDF took power he served as a top-level administrator in the government's executive section for about a year and a half. Although he had an important role in government he never was nor has he been a member of any political party. He gained standing with the EPRDF when for six years around 1980 he was a political prisoner under the Dergue because of role in the military in the previous government. The EPRDF began as a student movement that developed its following by holding protests. They had heard of him and as a relatively prominent person who had no political affiliation he was a convenient target for their protests and they demanded his release from prison. As a high profile individual he was a good staff member to bring into the newly formed government even though it soon became apparent that he could not work within the system set up by the governing group. He left government over a difference having to do with principles.

Since at the time you could not easily leave the government without suffering some retribution he was out of work for a year. In 1994 he was able to start doing part-time consulting work with NGOs and this became a real job the next year.

His organizational position changed in 1995 during the period leading up to the first parliamentary election under the new government. He was working in the Education for Democracy (EFD) NGO when his leadership decided to join with four other NGOs to form a national movement for voter education. The NGOs agreed that they needed a national coordinator and although other people were proposed AB was made that coordinator. Two American NGOs funded their efforts. His coalition educated about 12 million citizens about voting that year. They also provided 749 election observers.

Having led this big national effort representing the EFD, AB decided that he could go out on his own and form a new organization and his friends agreed so he created the

organization ADC. He immediately gained support from a large American foundation.

Creating ADC was in line with the new constitution that had been written in the 1991-1994 period. The organization emphasized human rights, democracy, and good government and this was very much in line with government practice. There was this new government in place and necessary institutions for democratic governance had to be created simply for it to function. But neither the government nor the citizens had clear understandings of what the principles of democracy were or what institutions should exist to carry them out. So there was a period that lasted at least up to the 2000 election when the institutions of government were being invented. During that time AB and his organization were important partners in that process.

AB was particularly committed to educating citizens so that they would get a sense of what their rights and responsibilities were. Only with knowledge about what rights were and how one should act to advance these would citizens have the capacity to stand up for their rights. He wanted them to stand with their chins up, opposing government practices when necessary that were violating their rights. Despite this assertive position his was not an oppositional movement. Rather ADC worked in partnership with the government because there was a broad agreement that institutional invention was essential. The process both involved creating an educated and involved citizenry while also creating specific organizational forms that would BE the government.

At the very beginning small grants fed AB's organization. They received a grant of 42,000 birr (the Ethiopian currency) for three months from the American foundation mentioned earlier and from Canadian SIDA. They set up an office and recruited 34 young women and men who they trained in human rights education. When the money ran out they shifted the office to his residence. Because their project grew so fast and seemed so effective, they received a follow-up grant for $33,000 and this allowed them to move out of his residence. Donors were invited in to see the operation and, being convinced, donors provided yet more grant money—this time 55,000 birr (about $5500).

With an apparently secure flow of funding AB and his leadership group decided they had to "start a fire"—they wanted to engage government more directly. Parliament had been in office for one year which was enough time for office holders to get comfortable in their new status but not enough time for them to really move forward on creating essential procedures and guidelines for governance. ADC chose to organize a town meeting.

They invited members of parliament (MPs) from the ruling party and from the other parties. Although they wanted the government to send two MPs to the town meeting the government leaders were reluctant and long, long negotiations followed. Finally, the government agreed to send one MP who was very articulate as a public speaker and who also was absolutely loyal to the EPRDF. Two independent MPs also came to the meeting.

The public turned out in force and asked what the parliament had done in one year. It was a fiery engagement. The MPs defended themselves by referring to 44 proclamations that had been approved in the previous year. The citizens responded that no programs had been created that actually reached the people. Since the press had come to the town meeting the public complaints received prominent coverage and the debates that grew out of the meeting were a major public focus for one month.

All of the public discussion gave ADC visibility and legitimacy that they did not have before. Although the government did not like public meetings, his organization called for more of them. The organization organized meetings that addressed fundamental questions of national governance. Some of these were held in locations like the national theater where nearly 2000 people could attend including the important members of the diplomatic community. The meetings became a focus of press coverage and national discussion.

These events were the consequence of a plan ABC launched in 1995 when they received the grant for $33,000. The organization started a national program for creating interfaces between local government officials and citizens, especially opinion leaders. When public meetings were organized, ABC wrote position papers based on the citizens' testimonies. They then would ask the government to respond. The government always would provide a rosy picture in response. The citizen leaders would then critique the response, usually disagreeing and providing a counter-report to the one the government provided in response to the ACB position paper. All three documents then would be given to citizens at large in public meetings in order to get a public reaction in terms of their direct experience with government programs. The people would give testimony and ABC would then produce an overall report of proceedings. Having asked the public to be involved in this dialog process ABC then would send the proceedings to the Prime Minister, to the local government, to the regional government, and to donors. Since the reports included public statements of what they expected from government, if the government did not provide an adequate response this often led to citizen opposition.

Although the government did not like these meetings, our informant, AB, said they were not viewed by government as organizing for the opposition. Rather at this stage of evolution the government still was developing a structure. Its operations did not necessarily work well and important members of the government knew this. The local meetings showed that programs that were supposed to work in a certain way were not being carried out properly. The central government may have had proper intentions but their directives simply were not being carried out at the local government level. The critique meetings gave the central government ammunition for confronting local government and sometimes firing and replacing program officials. AB pointed out that not all towns

had layers of local officials between the national government and actual program implementation. He mentioned Diredawe Town as a place that is directly run by the central government and the public meetings had particular relevance there.

At that time in the late 1990s, international NGOs and embassies approached ABC feeling that they were on the right track. Their support continued through the 2000 election and up to the 2005 election. By this time their budget had risen to 3.5-5 million ($350,000-$500,000) birr from international sources. One reason the government gave for creating the Charities and Societies Law is that local NGOs were being funded by outside governments and NGOs. Government claimed that international sources promoted values that were not indigenous to Ethiopia. Local NGOs sought that funding and implemented programs because they wanted the funding and they became resource dependent.

The funding pattern AB describes shows that enthusiasm among international NGOs and foreign governments certainly played a role in fueling a movement for public discourse and demands for government accountability. The key question is whether enthusiasm among Ethiopians for this sort of grass roots dialog, civil society, and pluralistic democracy represents cultural imperialism. It is clear that informants like AB do not believe the cultural imperialism argument. He and his associates would claim they were the authors of the ideas and actions they undertook. Furthermore, the enthusiasm we see among the Ethiopian people for public meetings and dialog come from institutions of public participation that exist within Ethiopian society and also from the simple proposition that all people value freedom and a voice in programs and activities that are central to their lives [17].

One of the themes our informant, AB, kept returning to is that there were no institutions of government in the early 1990s and especially in 1995 when the first parliament took office. There was this period of social creativity where his organization, ACB, worked to help invent the institutions. For this work they seemed to have a good cooperative relationship with government.

One of the institutional "absences" was that in 1995 there was only one political party—the governing EPDRF—along with a bunch of independent parliament members who had formed no alternative or opposition parties. Through his organization's public debates the process helped to coalesce new opposition political parties and they were in place for the 2000 election. Whether or not the government liked this change (they do not seem to support opposition parties in 2010) AB stated that it was an essential part of creating a truly democratic political system.

Some of the issues they worked on involved large-scale institutional questions. He mentioned, for example, that there were no provisions for recalling parliament when that was necessary. Creating a procedure for this to happen was not controversial from the standpoint of government but rather represented an aspect of the mechanics of an adequate governmental system that had to exist. His organization worked in partnership with government and the parliament to invent those procedures. Clearly his group was influential, had a lot of legitimacy, and had an effective communication arrangement with the people in power.

ABC was engaging parliament both in terms of specific issues and in terms of its internal norms and operating rules. Simple things like having a code of proper dress for members did not exist and had to be created. ACB argued for rules that were accepted. New rules required that members should wear a coat and tie to parliament to foster a climate of respect. His organization helped to figure out other nuts and bolts procedures having to do with the proper way to run internal operations of the parliament and the executive branch of the government.

Despite this partnership AB was also a critic and running large public forums carried risks. After one of the largest and most successful meetings a security official congratulated him but commented that there would be consequences. Sure enough, being responsible for the meeting he was called to account by the government. They dug up a minor issue dating from when he worked for the government and took him to court. He ended up receiving a two-year prison sentence.

Interestingly, while he was in prison he continued to run his organization and continued to interact with the media. In early 2000 he stimulated the process by which his organization prepared for the 2000 election. Since he was released in March, 2000, he was able to participate in the last two months of election training and preparations.

He was not afraid in prison because he had been in prison before and knew he could handle the situation. He was able to maintain communication with the outside because he taught high school English to other prisoners. They became his strong supporters and they provided him with a network for communicating with the outside through family members who came to visit them.

When he got out of prison in March, 2000, he immediately started working on the election and voter education. There really was not an issue at the time about reporting irregularities as there would be in 2005. The role he and his organization played truly was to make public dialog happen and to create ways for people to listen to the debate.

Despite his imprisonment there was a basic, cooperative relationship between himself, his organization, and the government. They shared an understanding that after the communist rule of the Dergue, there was a challenge to create democratic participation, institutions of government, and a system for ruling. His organization had criticisms to make but their main role was that of educating the voters. His organization voiced complaints but it did so because a fundamental tenet of democracy is accountability. They heard the concerns of citizens and presented their statements to the government. The government seemed to accept that give and take were necessary and legitimate.

Civil Society Institute

The Civil Society Institute (CSI) is an organization founded by a political science professor at an Ethiopian university who had experience teaching in Europe and who was a successful author writing academic books about the Ethiopian political system. When the organization began it primarily did conflict resolution work involving competing ethnic groups in the southeastern part of the country. Through this work organization members gained skill developing rapport with community-level political work and building trusting network ties in situations where competing groups did not trust each other. As part of doing this work CSI also did work on research, training researchers, civic development, and women's empowerment. This allowed them to get international NGO grants to do work in communities around the country on voter education, creation of public forums around performance of government programs, and helping to build citizen advocacy groups.

In preparation for the 2005 election the organization worked with more than 2 million citizens and they had built a network of educators and political trainers all around the country. Not surprising when the government implemented the Charities and Societies Law these activities were forbidden and CSI was forced to lay off most or its staff. But the field workers remained in place and although they were not paid the continued their training and organizing work. Citizen organizations they had helped to found also continued their work, often branching out into new areas of political action, partly in response to the expansion of political repression by the state.

The Case

CD was a professor at an Ethiopian University for many years teaching things related to civil society and peace studies before he left to found this NGO 12 years ago (that would be 1998). He also had 4 years teaching in Europe.

When CD began the organization, it had the name of the Research Center on Democracy (RCD). It did work on research, training researchers, civic development, and women's empowerment. The specific topics this included were civic education, which particularly emphasized voter education, good governance, advocacy, human rights, conflict and transformation, and women's empowerment.

They worked with 15.7 million voters in 2005 and won awards for their work because they had developed effective methods for working with citizens and informing them about the electoral process. SCI had 56 employees in seven offices around the country last November and now it has eight employees remaining and all are located here in the headquarters. Three of those are due to be laid off soon.

In 2002 CD started to work strategically forming a coalition of 6 NGOs that worked together on voter education. (His organization was the lead organization initiating this network.) Looking ahead to the 2005 election they began working in June 2004 and continued until Election Day 2005.

His approach sought to include all institutions in the voter movement. This particularly included the Catholic, Orthodox, and evangelical churches. They trained 1200 leaders from different institutions. They worked with the national election board and had their support in this work. When Western governments asked where civic education for voting was happening, they could point to RCD, which could provide data on the work that was being done. This gave the organization lots of publicity. A condition of the work is that they could not favor any political party although all parties benefitted from their efforts. The organization contributed regularly to journalistic publications. DRC made sure that discussions were available in three languages and that publications were widely distributed around Ethiopia.

RCD carried out civic education by holding meetings where selected leaders and political parties met in open meetings with the citizens. The organization trained citizens ahead of time to be prepared and to ask questions. None of the citizens had participated in a "town meeting" style discussion before but during the meetings the organized citizens asked hard questions that politicians often could not answer. CD says it was an amazing development in political culture.

During the 2005 long election season, there were a series of town-hall debates among political parties, which were open to anyone in the public and mostly transmitted, live on ETV and Ethiopian Radio. The public had an unprecedented level of enthusiasm and interest in the debates and politics in general. These and other related free activities by both the opposition (mainly CUD and United Ethiopia Democratic Forces/UEDF) and the ruling party dominated public discussions. The spirit of change and public interest on the elections was so high that those who didn't register thinking it was not going to be any different from the 2000 elections regretted this neglect, realizing the fact that they were not going to be part of a turning point in Ethiopia's history.

NGOs were very active in advocacy and voter education and they ignited interest among the public motivating people to exercise their democratic rights through the ballots. They empowered the public across the country to make informed decisions in this regard.

These activities led to the historic turnout on the Election Day, May 15, 2005. RCD's efforts went on through the election in May and into June, 2005, when post-election violence started. This led to a government crackdown where democratic leaders were arrested or forced to flee the country. This was the beginning of the authoritarian regime which continued in control until 2018. Through it all CD was writing analyses of the strengths and weakness of the different political parties in the newspapers as well as about the political developments that were happening.

None of the pre-election activities in 2005 were being repeated leading up to the 2010 election (the time when these interviews were conducted) other than the usual campaigns recorded and edited debates – not open to the public – on ETV among political parties. The government undertook a variety of

effective strategies to tighten all access to election news. This dramatic change compared to 2005 led to frustration on the part of the public. The opposition became fragmented and the public interest with respect to politics went dead. Meanwhile, the EPRDF increased its member and support base mainly by attaching required membership to job opportunities for new graduates, access to post graduate studies, and other public services. It became apparent to the people that the EPRDF was obviously going to win the election and citizens had low interest in taking part since the outcome was known in advance.

As an academic with an interest in political issues, CD understood that the government had some problems. They were in a corner and there was a real prospect of violence if the political process and the election were just allowed to unfold and a result similar to the one in 2005 occurred.

Now people understood politics and issues. Since the Dergue and under the EPRDF many aspects of liberal democracy were developed—a free press, political parties, and political dialog. A political space opened up. The people in general gained lots of information. Now the public wanted a change. The EPRDF had been in power 19 years but the people wanted something different and some were willing to sacrifice themselves to achieve change. The crisis might be even worse than 2005 if the system were not controlled. Clamping down on NGOs is one of the government's efforts to contain its weak position.

That civil society organizations are not present is one reason the public in general is discouraged. They don't see voting as leading to democracy but rather suspect it will be a tool supporting dictatorship. 4600 civil society organizations existed until last year. At first when the Charities and Societies Law was passed the government did nothing to implement or enforce it allowing organizations a grace period to adjust to the new regulations. Beginning in February 2010, the Law began to be implemented. When this happened organizations were required to register either as Ethiopian Charities – termed "local" NGOs that could not receive more than 10% of their funding from international sources – or "resident" NGOs, which could not work in specific areas of activity as defined by the law. Civic education work and things categorized as advocacy no longer were allowed for resident organizations so their previously developed programs had to be terminated since also could not receive funding from international NGOs. The consequences were drastic and the number of organizations dropped to 1500.

There has been protest about these changes all over the country and this protest is continuing. Objections are not just to the loss of political participation and free speech that government action has produced. The 4600 organizations contributed directly to the welfare of communities.

They were a significant employment source nationally. An organization like his had offices and employees all over the country and now these offices are now closed and the people are out of work. These are not ordinary people, CD emphasized. They are people with college degrees and they were highly paid people. His organization paid 3400 birr per month for people with bachelor's degrees and 13000 per month for people with PhD degrees. Big local NGOs would employ 100 people and so not only are these people out of work but their families are affected as well.

A minimum of 2 million people were employed by NGOs nationally by his estimation. There also were a significant number of part-time employees who also are now out of work. He would often hire 50 teachers for 6 months to be trained and to serve as staff for doing voter education before an election. Thus part time staff could also be highly trained people but they too are out of work.

Old funders cannot support RCD because the organizations' programs are changing by necessity. Their previous funders could fund their new programs—environmental education or development, for example. All of their new programs continue to work for rights. It's just that RCD cannot use that language now because of the government bans and the focus of their work must be on infrastructure development. International NGO funders will not change their grant programs to take into account this necessary change in language, so RCD grant applications would not fall into categories the NGOs have defined for funding. This frustrates CD because he has had long term relationships with international funders but they are unwilling to be flexible. CD says they do not have a strategic approach to their funding approach that could take the current situation in Ethiopia into account. International NGOs could intentionally work around government restrictions. Instead, they just are not putting resources into maintaining the organizations that they have helped to build up over years.

This is an important sort of neglect if you accept CD's theory that the government's crackdown on NGOs is a short-term strategy to deal with dangers associated with the coming election. Once the election is past, he believes government either will ease up on NGO restrictions or NGOs that existed in the past will revise their programs to focus on the infrastructure aspects of civil society development and civil society will continue to advance. CD argues that the overall project for people like him is one of furthering democracy and he views democracy as an overall process of social development, not as a specific project or a set of specific projects. The international NGOs should understand this and restructure their funding so that they can maintain the democracy building organizations they funded over the years.

This is not just CD's complaint but is a constant source of complaint and discussion in the NGO community, he said. He is on the boards of five NGOs and his organization is part of one network of 10 NGOs and another network of 40. He is an advisor to the Evangelical Church Peace Network and his organization is part of a national peace network. It is within these networks that they talk continually about their situation. They are unhappy with Western NGOs because democracy is a long-term process and Western NGOs should be investing in this process.

CD reflected that his whole life has centered on creating programs for civic education and governance education. Mostly this has been OK with the government. He began doing this work under the Dergue and he was able to make the shift to continue it when the EPRDF came in power as he shifted to the university to do his work.

He talked about the new direction of his organization's work. He continues to work with networks of community-based organizations (CBOs) and these are involved in environmental education, entrepreneurship, small business administration, finance administration, and research methods. The CBOs are organized collectivistically and they work with local communities to create economic ventures. To bring people into economic activity requires that they have an understanding of management and they know what it means to participate in the market. Building up ventures and helping people become more self-sustaining will, CD believes, promote democracy as well since helping people to overcome hunger is one pillar of democracy.

In his view you have to see democracy as a process. You have to build skills among the people and see this as a long-term project. You have to support skills building and not be narrowly program oriented. In one sense, CD thinks the current cut backs in funding create opportunities since those who lost jobs must use their skills to start new projects. But in a depressed economy this is difficult and the West really ought to be supporting new projects.

Lawyers for Women

Lawyers for Women (LW) is an organization entirely comprised of employed, women attorneys. One consequence is that the organization is not very dependent on funding to operate since members donate their time. Also, This case is different because leaders do not depend on an "old boys club". Rather they take an advocacy stance on women's issues that have been neglected, in part because of the weakly institutionalized nature of the government and its services. Being officers of the court and well-worked into the legal structure of Ethiopian society, LW members often have strong network connections with the power structure. This makes it hard for the government to attack the organization and its members even when they are sharply critical of government practices.

This also is true because when LW creates a new service, other organizations, including the government, tend to recognize that the service is important and necessary. These other organizations then adopt these functions and turn them into established, legitimate services. This allows the Lawyers to withdraw and to move on to something else. The Ethiopian institutional state needs this innovativeness, so even though the government is uncomfortable with criticism, the organization is allowed to continue without much interference.

The Case

Lawyers for Women was an important target group for us to interview because it is one of the few nationally prominent charitable organizations that chose, upon implementation of the Charities and Societies Law, to register as a local charity rather than as a resident (funded internationally) charity as most of the other NGOs have done. Other NGOs found it impossible to register as local charities because they could not raise sufficient funds to survive from sources internal to Ethiopia alone. Lawyers for Women have chosen to raise funds within Ethiopia and one of the major challenges we talked about is the task of fundraising for an impersonal organization committed to an abstract cause. This is common in the West but it simply had not been done in Ethiopia in the past in any significant way.

It was difficult for us to arrange this interview because the organization is exceedingly cautious and our project is inherently hard to understand within the Ethiopian context. But by dropping by the office we were able to explain ourselves and arrange a later interview with someone who knew the organization well.

How the organization relates to the Charities and Societies Law is sensitive because the primary reason an organization like this one would choose to register as a local organization is that by the law, since it raises funds locally, it then would be allowed to carry out advocacy functions that would be forbidden if it registered as a resident organization (receiving more than 10% of its funds from outside Ethiopia). The question remains whether as locally registered this organization still would actually be allowed to carry out advocacy activities.

The organization was begun 14 years ago, in 1996, founded by a few women lawyers. It started quickly to accumulate members who were attorneys in different disciplines of law and today it has 280 members. Only attorneys may be members of the association but from the beginning there was substantial interest from people in other disciplines as well as from male supporters. An additional status was created for these people, that of "associate member". The organization has 300 people in this category.

Before enactment of the Charities and Societies Law most of the organization's funding came from foreign donors who supported particular projects. The Association gained support from a consortium of foreign donors—many of them embassies that would rotate their donations so no one embassy would have long-term funding responsibility. Oxfam also has been an important funder and they have continued giving at a level that would hold their contributions at less than 10% of the budget as allowed by law. More extensive international funding has now ended but since the 1-year grace period associated with the Law just ended, Lawyers for Women is just now becoming seriously immersed in the challenge of how to raise the funds it will need to keep operating.

The Association pursues women's issues (not a surprise there). These include:

- The recognition of women's rights in society.
- Policy development.

- Efforts for the Education Department to raise awareness of women's issues.
- Legal aide services provided to women
  - Mostly related to violence
  - Employment cases
  - Property issues
  - Not so much routine legal assistance related to the diverse issues of law that any citizen might encounter.

Following the theme of what work the organization has done, our respondent emphasized research undertaken by the organization to inform policy formation on such issues as family law or the pension law. The organization played an important role in creation of the new Family Law and also in the revised Criminal Law in those parts having to do with violence against women. In this research Lawyers for Women have functioned more like a lobby in the U.S. tradition than like the policy research support organizations one finds in the U.K. In the U.K. policy research is institutionalized in the parliamentary process so that the centers provide regular support to specific parties or offices of government as new policies are formulated. In Ethiopia the research is explicitly to advocate a certain point of view and to seek creation of a certain area of law that might have been left out without their insistent voice.

In its first years, Lawyers for Women usually was a pioneer organization articulating the basic principles of some area of law that had been neglected or beginning a kind of legal services that had not previously been available. What happened in most areas is that other organizations came in and began offering the same service or a similar one under their auspices. This meant that the Lawyers for Women could move on and put most of their energy into some new issue or initiative. It also means that, with funding cutbacks associated with the Charities and Societies Law, functions performed by this organization have not necessarily been lost since other organizations would continue the function or service. This is one reason that the organization was able to register as a local organization. It was more important for it to continue to explore new areas of law and legal policy than to hold onto old services that it had been providing. It might well continue to be involved in service provision but as a support organization not actually providing staff to a given function.

An interesting example concerns the free legal aid that the Lawyers for Women provided for years. At the beginning they were the only group providing this free legal aid. But gradually a government unit at the district level began providing this service. Lawyers for Women used to receive office space from subsidiaries to provide this service but as this function is being taken over by the government so that is no longer necessary. However, the Lawyers for Women continue to provide consultation to the subsidiaries concerning this service. This shows the way that partnerships with government around specific, narrow services can be an important part of their work that can continue on despite other restrictions.

In general terms, the ability of Lawyers for Women to continue their mission would depend on successful fundraising. At the time of our interview, they had started to do this work and they had been involved in two public fundraising events. I remember these being fairs or some similar event that were organized to raise funds—this is the kind of small-scale fundraiser many organizations in the U.S. run. This fits one of their fundraising practices which is to fundraise among less wealthy people while they also target some wealthier people hoping to receive larger gifts from them.

Fundraising is a trial and error activity for the organization. Many people know about the organization and support its activities but our interviewee worried that people might get tired of donating. Fundraising of this kind has never been done before in Ethiopian society. As we talked, she agreed that there are many people with money and with their gifts they could solve the problems of the organization. There also are traditions of philanthropy within Ethiopian society. However, people will generally give to extended family members or to their community (perhaps funding a building project). Giving to an organization like Lawyers for Women clashes with cultural traditions because people are not used to giving to an impersonal organization like this one and they also are not used to giving to an abstract cause (where they would give willingly to address hunger).

Perhaps the entire enforcement process was just too new at the time of our interview for anyone, government or others, to really know how enforcement would work as the process went forward. Alternatively, the regulatory structure might remain somewhat loose to be applied with certain issues of specific concern and in a somewhat irregular way as cases became apparent and a matter of concern for the government.

Discussion

Comparing the structure of civil societies in forty-two countries, Salamon [6] explains that variations in strong state structures shape the character of civil societies. Although he shows that civil societies exist in all of his countries, they are small where there is an authoritarian government. In communist societies, the belief was that there should be a direct relationship between citizens and the state. Voluntary associations, the components of civil society, tended to be seen as conservative and potentially subversive. This is a reason that considerable resources have been contributed by NGOs and international state actors to create or build up civil society in countries where communist regimes have fallen. Where we find an authoritarian state, we expect to see a small, weakly integrated civil society.

The reverse is the case in Ethiopia. After the revolution that led to a new government in 1992 support was given for democratic principles until the election of 2005. After that election the government outlawed democratic opposition groups and put their leaders including elected officials in prison. After 2005 the government became increasingly repressive outlawing the free press and, shortly before the data collection reported in this paper, outlawing NGOs that received more than 10% of

their funding from international sources. Two of the people interviewed here led organizations that relied primarily on international funding and they were forced to lay off most of their large number of employees. The third organization chose to become a "local organization" that would support itself through fundraising carried out within Ethiopia. These conditions are what led us to call Ethiopia after 2005 an authoritarian state.

However, our respondents insist, and our case studies show, that despite this, civil society is strong. The Civil Society Institute reported that its large staff worked with around 3 million citizens around the country who participated in their democracy education programs. This was not just informational teaching but it engaged citizens in observing local and regional government officials, paying attention to whether programs were working effectively and accountably, and working to remove officials who did not function properly.

While the national government initially allowed this work by Civil Society Institute it eventually forced them to stop. But our respondent pointed out that their employees continue to live in the communities they served and people they educated about particular issues have begun scrutinizing an ever-wider array of government services. He asserted that once civil society programs like those of his organization take root, they continue and grow as a part of the local political life of the country. Our informant took the position that government repression would not really stop civil society organizing on the ground and he was confident that eventually the authoritarian government would have to allow democratic participation to re-emerge, as it has done.

Civil society is not just about voting and the democratic organizing of citizens. There are also functions that involve conflict resolution, control of crime and violence, dispute resolution, amelioration of discrimination, and provision of welfare services, among other things, that citizens and communities want. These are functions that governments sponsor or perform in countries where the state is strong but that civil society organizations perform in Ethiopia. The Civil Society Institute played an important role in limiting regional conflicts between ethnic groups until the government forbad their work and took over that function ineffectively. Lawyers for Women created a variety of functions like women's battering shelters, anti-discrimination programs, community services for women, and job creation programs. Because they use volunteer labor donated by lawyers the organization could develop these activities without international funding. Once the programs were established and successful, other organizations and sometimes the state would take them over. Although Lawyers for Women was often critical of the government, their activities were so popular and so well supported by the public that the government rarely attacked the organization or its workers.

Participation International played a direct role in building government institutions. Leaders of this organization had been nonprofit entrepreneurs during the 1990s. International NGOs and the foreign aid departments of Western governments had a large presence in Ethiopia at the time largely because of the famine that affected the country during the 1980s. Ethiopia has been the country receiving the largest amount of NGO funding of any country in sub-Saharan Africa [4]. A condition of being given this aid was that Ethiopia had to create a constitution and follow government practices that guaranteed democratic practices.

Even though those practices were not followed after 2005, a consequence of these funder demands is that Ethiopians who were able to access these funds and build NGOs became local experts in democratic practices. Since there were no institutions of government in place these individuals, as our informant explained, came to play a central role in formulating regulations, defining and implementing key values, and building institutional values into the government. This being the case, the state was not the sort of distant, bureaucratic institution envisioned by Salamon and other Western civil society theorists.

Ethiopia has a relatively small network of intellectual and social policy leaders. They may have gone to school together and they experienced the Dergue and the revolution together. They may take harsh, coercive actions towards each other but they also know each other well, they know each others' tendencies, and they maintain rapport, even if they are enemies [i].

The leaders we interviewed continued to have access to government leaders. Their network connectedness is one reason our leaders were confident that civil society would persist and outlast the authoritarian phase of the government. But another reason for shared access is that government and civil society organizations perform mutually supportive functions.

The African Democracy Coalition played an important role in designing and developing core institutions of government. The government had a continuing need to develop its administrative infrastructure and ADC continues to have the expertise to help with these tasks. The government also needs for the people to feel engaged in debate about government policies and programs and ADC has been the vehicle for organizing public fora. Even if the government arrests the leader and forces the organization to cut back it needs public discussion that is disconnected from the government so that the people feel there is value in political participation. Without that, government is in danger of losing its legitimacy and being a society with many contentious ethnic groups cohesion in the society is in danger—which ultimately is what happened leading up to 2018.

Similarly, once a large network of local organizations and interest groups that pay attention to politics are developed, that system does not go away with repression. As CD tells us in relating the story of CSI, the large number of employees the organization had distributed around the country remain in place even if they are not employed. Being highly educated, these actors situated at the local level have the skills to analyze local government programs and policies. The citizens they trained

when funding was available continue to build and develop their organizations and they challenge government at the local level. Social cohesion would be most effectively maintained if this cadre of local intelligentsia were paid and integrated into a national system. Cutting them off, these people, their families, and people they supported financially are thrown into a situation of financial need and this makes them a large group, capable of being mobilized. They are civil society embodied, and a relatively small authoritarian state like that in Ethiopia just does not have the power to keep them under control.

Lawyers for Women may present the most difficult problem for the government since as attorneys they are, in a sense, both part of government and part of civil society. As attorneys they are part of the society's social elite. They also are administratively positioned to see areas of governmental failure and service need. The organization is an essential social innovator in a society that has been in the process of evolving from a condition of institutional impoverishment to one that is beginning to build the repertoire of services recognized as necessary in modern societies.

Since many of the services Lawyers for Women are developing already exist in other societies, it often is a short path to making these services seem necessary and develop the pragmatic administrative features that make new organizations viable. In the West, nonprofit organizations often begin as social movements that gradually build social and political legitimacy and eventually are supported by governmental laws and funded programs. Knowing this history, the path in Ethiopia between organizational innovation and full institutionalization often is short [ii].

Comprised of educated, activist people who have knowledge of necessary legal and social service institutions that have developed in more industrialized countries, Lawyers for Women is a moving target that retains its autonomy and its capacity to survive as a critic by inventing new, necessary services that are often drawn into government or the established social services institutional system. But this means that the authoritarian government cannot squelch the independent civil society elements that exist in this organization. Lawyers for Women just seems impervious to the Charities and Societies Law despite its critical stance toward the ruling clique of the government.

Conclusion

Because the Ethiopian government could not establish a strong and honest presence in local areas around the country, it could not compete with local democratic movements that provided basic services and that have built a strong commitment to democratic values among the people. This was the civil society our informants insisted remained strong despite the repressiveness of the authoritarian government. The authoritarian style of the Ethiopian government could not constrain and shape the character of civil society in the way communist authoritarian societies with strong states were able to do in the manner described by Salamon [6].

At the same time, civil society in Ethiopia needs and is interdependent with government. Each of the organizations we have described is intertwined with different aspects of government and all of them are committed to the notion that active, accountable government is essential for a health social and political society to grow and develop. We have argued elsewhere [18] that civil society requires government to exist and that in liberal democracies governments require the active presence of civil society. Both sides have certain rights but they also have mutual responsibilities. Civil society is made up of a thatch of vertical and horizontal network relationships that also are tied into government. If civil society is eliminated and relationships go only from government directly to the citizens, then democratic participation is impossible. The force of the argument by Salamon [6] is that in practice no society exists without a civil society. That is necessary because governments are built around mutual participation between people and the state [19].

If governments outlaw civil society organizations these relationships can be degraded and the result is that personal freedoms are eliminated. However, for this to happen, the state must be large, powerful, and monolithic. In a society like Ethiopia the state is weak, even if it is authoritarian. We have argued elsewhere that in important respects Ethiopian society is self-organizing, or what we have called a stable anarchy [5]. In this situation the government cannot actually eliminate, or even seriously intimidate, civil society. That is the story demonstrated by the case examples presented in these pages.

References

1. Al Jazeera (2018) "Ethiopia Pardons Hundreds Arrrested on Terrorism Charges."[View Article]
2. Allo, A.K (2018) "Ethiopia's new Prime Minister has had a stellar two months, can he keep it up?" [View Article]
3. Amnesty Intenational, "Ethiopia Human Rights Concerns." [View Article]
4. Nega, B and C. Milofsky (2011) "Ethiopia's Anti-NGO Law and its Consequences for Economic Development", *Community Development Journal* 46: ii33–ii48 [View Article]
5. Milofsky, C and B. Nega (2013) "Stable Anarchy and the Persistence of Civil Society Organizations in Ethiopia." *Spanda Journal* 4:41-52[View Article]
6. Salamon, L. S. W, Sokolowski, and M. A. Haddock (2017) Explaining Civil Society Development. A Social Origins Approach. *Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press* [View Article]
7. Putnam, R. D (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. *Simon & Schuster* [View Article]
8. Putnam, R.D. (2015) Our Kids. The American Dream in Crisis. *Simon and Schuster* [View Article]
9. Inkeles A and D. H. Smith (1974) Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries. Cambridge, Mass.: *Harvard University Press*. [View Article]
10. Fisher J (1997) Nongovernments. NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World. Bloomfield CT: *Kumerian Press* [View Article]

11. Milofsky C (1987) "Neighborhood-Based Organizations: A Market Analogy," pp 277-295 in Walter W. Powell (ed.), The Nonprofit Sector. *Yale University Press*. [View Article]

12. Milofsky C (2008) Smallville. Institutionalizing Community in Twenty-First Century America. *Community Development Journal* 45: 140–143. [View Article]

13. Acheson N and C. Milofsky (2008) "Peace Building and Participation in Northern Ireland: Local Social Movements and the Policy Process since the 'Good Friday' Agreement." *Ethnopolitics* 7: 63-80. [View Article]

14. Acheson N and C. Milofsky (2011) "Derry Exceptionalism and an Organic Model of Sustained Dialog." *Columbia University Press* 167-185 [View Article]

15. Hammer J (2016) "Once a Bucknell Professor, Now the Comamander of an Ethiopian Rebel Army. Why Berhanu Nega Traded a Tenured Position for the Chance to Lead a Revolutionary Force Against an Oppressive Regime." *New York Times Magazine*. [View Article]

16. Plaut M (2010) "Aid for Arms in Ethiopia." BBC World Service, Assignment. [View Article]

17. Sen A (1999) Development as Freedom. *New York Knopf*. [View Article]

18. Hunter A.D and C Milofsky (2007) Pragmatic Liberalism. Constructing a Civil Society. *New York: Palgrave MacMillan* [View Article]

19. Milofsky C (2011) "Democratic Governance in the Wake of Authoritarian Regimes: Ethiopia as a Case Example." 17-19 [View Article]

i. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ARNOVA/ARCOSA Research Conference, Cairo, Egypt, July 26-28, 2018

ii. This pattern is common in small societies that have conflicts. Catholic and Protestant leaders in Northern Ireland usually knew each other and had known each other from when they were young. Generals at the Battle of Gettysburg from both sides knew each other from their student days at the army training college, West Point. Journalists in Ethiopia report that government leaders asked them to say hello to old school friends who were leaders of the opposition

Citation: Milofsky C, Hunter A (2020) Civil Society and Authoritarian Rule. Ethiopia's Charities and Societies Law and Experiences of NGO Leaders. Sociology Insights 3: 001-013.